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Gradually, the Portuguese troops adapted to the characteristics of the guerrilla war, where the great fronts replaced the massive actions, the surprise and the action of small units of great mobility substitute the traditional units and population has, for both sides, an essential role.
In Angola, the liberation movements also suffered an evolution, not only regarding the principles of the military action but also in what concerns the political capacity and diplomatic position.
The MPLA, facing serious internal problems, was, during these first years, essentially a group of leaders looking for boards and troops. After 1964, under the protection of the government of Conzo-Brazzaville and with the technical assistance and material of the countries of Easter Europe, it turns essentially to the formation of those military boards, while its importance in Cabinda, Dembos or even in the cities, was almost insignificant.
The guerrilla actions were almost exclusively assumed by the FNLA, without excluding violent confrontations with troops of the rival movement. With the independence of Zambia (1966), something changed. The MPLA started to dispose of a close support which until then was missing, since Zaire always supported the FNLA. With headquarters in Zambia, the MPLA opens the East front, creating serious difficulties to the action of Portuguese troops.
At the same time, there is the formation of UNITA which, after some important operations against the Portuguese troops, establishes an agreement with these troops, forming a strange alliance in order to fight the growing influence of the MPLA.
During the following years, the penetration of the three nationalist forces of Angola became each time more difficult. Several factors conditioned this situation, obviously combined with the military action of the Portuguese troops. On one hand, the application by the Portuguese Armed Forces of a new politics based on psychosocial plans (abuse suppression and sanitary, educational and economical assistance). On the other hand, the continuity of hostilities and some internal divisions inside the liberation movements.
After 1973, in spite of the intensification of the Eastern front and the UNITA’s actions, the situation was sufficiently stabilized in order to consider the possibility of trying other solutions, not exclusively military. This was at least the opinion of many officers. But the bad news were now coming from Guinea and Mozambique.
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